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SOME PATTERNS OF MARKET SHARES OF BRANDS WITHIN
AND ACROSS PRODUCT CATEGORIES
Abstract
This paper: (i) reports an empirical regularity in the market shares of brands;
(ii) presents a theoretical framework for understanding the observed regularity; (iii)
adduces additional empirical consequences of the framework, which are some coun-
terintuitive relationships among market shares of brands across different product
categories; and (iv) presents empirical evidence for these consequences, thus provid-
ing additional support for the theoretical framework. Our cross-sectional data on
market shares consists of 1171 brands in 91 product categories of foods and sporting
goods sold in the US. If we assign a lower rank to a brand with a higher market
share, then the key empirical regularity is that, in each category, the ratio of mar-
ket shares between two successively-ranked brands becomes smaller as one progresses
from higher-ranked to lower-ranked brands. The power law represents these patterns
well, in an absolute sense, and better than an alternative model, namely, the ex-
ponential form, which has been studied in the literature but without having been
compared to any alternative. The latter form predicts that the ratio of the market
shares of any two successively ranked brands is a constant. We present some poten-
tial implications of our findings for marketing practice and research. We also offer an
interpretation of the previously known square-root relationship between market share
and the order of entry of firms into an industry. The theoretical framework that we
present for understanding the patterns reported here shares its foundation with that
of the familiar Dirichlet-multinomial paradigm of brand purchases. This framework
has some intuitive interpretations; it accommodates multiple product categories; and
it allows for the entry and exit of brands over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bass (1995, p. G7) defines an empirical generalization as “a pattern or regular-
ity that repeats over different circumstances and that can be described by simple
mathematical, graphic, or symbolic methods.” Unlike a law of classical physics, an
empirical generalization is not necessarily universal, and its parameters are not neces-
sarily invariant across different circumstances. Empirical generalizations are typically
approximate rather than exact, and they are descriptive rather than directly causal
(Ehrenberg 1982). These generalizations facilitate the important task of construct-
ing theories (Ehrenberg 1995) and of generating testable consequences beyond the
original data (Simon 1968). The Pareto income distribution is an enduring empirical
generalization in economics (Persky 1992). The Bass diffusion model (Bass 1969) and
the Dirichlet-multinomial (DM) paradigm of brand purchases (Goodhardt, Ehrenberg
and Chatfield 1984) are important empirical generalizations in marketing.
We present a number of empirical findings concerning patterns of market shares
of brands. We also present some of the implications of these findings for marketing
practice and research. Our data, described in detail later, consists of 506 brands in
48 product categories of foods and 665 brands in 43 product categories of sporting
goods sold in the US. Examples of product categories of foods are orange juices and
breakfast cereals. Examples of brands within the product category of orange juices are
Minute Maid and Tropicana. We describe a theoretical framework for understanding
these observed patterns. This framework has many appealing features for the study
of market shares. It has intuitive implications concerning the growth rates of the
market shares. Also, it shares its probabilistic foundation with that of the familiar
DM paradigm of brand purchases noted above. We adduce empirical consequences
of this theoretical framework, which are some counterintuitive relationships among
market shares of brands across different product categories. We present empirical
evidence for these consequences, thus providing additional support for the framework.
In the spirit noted in the first paragraph, our analysis is descriptive and approx-
imate, rather than causal and exact. The power law is a central organizing concept
of our analysis. In the context of brands, it says that if brand j has the rj-th highest
market share sj, then sj = A(a + rj)
−b, where A, a, and b are constants. A core
empirical content of the power law is that the decrease in the market share between
two successively ranked brands becomes smaller as one progresses from higher-ranked
to lower-ranked brands. A testable alternative to the power law, which we examine,
is that the ratio of market shares of any two successively ranked brands is a constant.
This implies the exponential form, sj = Ge
−grj , where G and g are constants.
Our main empirical findings, when product categories are considered one at a
time, are as follows: (1) The power law holds very well in an absolute sense; the R2
values are consistently over 0.90 and often over 0.95. (2) The power law describes the
data significantly better than the exponential form. (3) The relative superiority of the
power law over the exponential form is greater for those product categories that have
lower values of b. This is consistent with Mandelbrot’s (1963) theoretical prediction
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that a power law with sufficiently large values of the coefficient b approximates the
exponential form. (4) The exponential form fits better for lower-ranking market
shares than for higher-ranking market shares.1
We also present findings from some “derived” data sets on market shares. As
will be seen later, they contribute to a theoretical understanding of the power law.
The three derived data sets, described in detail later, are created by: (a) pooling the
market shares across all product categories; (b) considering those brands that occupy
the highest rank in their respective product categories; and (c) taking the averages
of the market shares of brands that hold a particular rank in their respective product
categories, then considering these averages across the ranks. We show that all of the
four results stated in the previous paragraph hold for each of the three derived data
sets just described. These regularities are counterintuitive in the sense that there are
no a priori reasons to expect that any such patterns exist among the market shares
of brands across product categories.
We have abstracted from several important topics related to the present paper, in
order to keep the paper within reasonable bounds of length and scope. Among these
are: (i) potential implications of our findings for government policies, including those
towards market dominance; (ii) the possibility that analogues of our results from
the derived data sets may exist for phenomena other than market shares, such as
the distribution of city sizes or of individuals’ incomes; and (iii) general issues which
arise from the fact that the power law describes many patterns in the human, physical
and biological worlds (Brock (1999) and Gell-Mann (1994) provide perspectives and
citations). At the end of this paper, in the concluding section, we describe many
of the ways in which our empirical analysis can be extended with data which are
more comprehensive than those which we have used. We also discuss there some of
the ways in which the present descriptive and macroscopic analysis is complementary
to causal microscopic analysis of the market shares of brands in any given product
category.
Contributions of the present paper. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to
examine the power law for a large number of product categories, rather than for just
one or another product category. These findings suggest, in the spirit described at
the beginning of the paper, that the power law is a candidate to be considered as an
empirical regularity for the market shares of brands. Quite apart from this, there are
potential disadvantages of examining the power law while limiting oneself to just one
or another product category. For example, as will be seen later, the presence of the
1In an important study on market shares, Buzzell (1981) tested the exponential form, without
explicitly comparing it to an alternative specification. Like him, we find that the exponential form
fits the data reasonably well. However, our findings, including those summarized in this paragraph,
suggest that the power law is a better description of the data than the exponential form. Separately,
our analysis does not support two other hypotheses on market shares: (i) the “rule of three and
four” of the Boston Consulting Group (1987), which predicts that the three largest market shares
will be in the ratio 4:2:1; and (ii) Kotler’s hypothesis (1977) that the top three brands will have
40%, 30% and 20% market shares.
2
power law may then be attributed to the special characteristics of those categories,
without perhaps recognizing its widespread prevalence. In the literature, examples
of the application of the power law to individual product categories are Chung and
Cox (1994) on the number of hit albums produced by a music group, Adamic and
Huberman (2000) on the number of links pointing to a web site, and Kalyanaram,
Robinson and Urban (1995) on a relationship between market share and the order of
entry of firms producing prescription anti-ulcer drugs and certain packaged consumer
goods. Later, as a part of the discussion of the implications of our findings, we discuss
some differences between our findings and those of the last study just mentioned.
To our knowledge, this paper is also the first to report a set of empirical patterns
in the derived data sets. Our theoretical framework, which is not limited to one or
another product category, provides a possible way to understand the findings from
these data sets.
Organization of the paper. Section II presents some preliminaries. Section III de-
scribes the data and the estimation procedures. Section IV summarizes the empirical
findings. Section V presents a theoretical framework. Section VI summarizes some of
the implications of our findings for marketing practice and research. The concluding
section contains brief remarks on some of the important research topics which are
related to or follow from the present paper.
II. SOME PRELIMINARIES
Consider one product category with n brands; we will later deal with multiple
product categories. Suppose, for now, that no two brands have the same mar-
ket shares; we will deal later with ties in market shares. We assign the index
j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n to brands in decreasing order of market shares. Let sj denote
the market share of brand j. Let rj denote the market-share rank associated with
brand j. Since there are no ties here, rj = j, but, as will be seen later, this need not
always be the case. The power law and the exponential form are respectively:2
sj = A(a+ rj)
−b; and (1)
sj = Ge
−grj . (2)
Empirical contents of the power law and the exponential form. Define the “share
ratio” of two successively ranked brands as fj ≡ sj/sj+1. We assume that A > 0, a >
−1, and b > 0 for the power law, and that G > 0 and g > 0 for the exponential
2Sometimes the power law is expressed as sj = A′(a′+hrj)−b, where A′, a′, h and b are constants.
This yields (1) by setting A ≡ A′h−b and a ≡ a′/h. Expression (1) or its special cases are often
referred to, without consistency, as the Pareto Law, the discrete Pareto distribution, and Zipf’s Law.
A widely used special case is that with a = 0; the framework in Section V refers to this version. The
special case with a = 0 and b = 1 has been used extensively in the study of city sizes; see Gabaix
(1999). Kalyanaram, Robinson and Urban (1995), cited earlier, use the special case with a = 0 and
b = 1/2.
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form. These inequalities ensure that sj > 0 and fj > 1. The share ratio is fj =
[1 + (1/(a+ rj))]
b for the power law and fj = e
g for the exponential form. It follows
that fj > fj+1 for the power law and fj = fj+1 for the exponential form. As noted
earlier, this is a crucial difference between the empirical contents of (1) and (2). The
scaling coefficients A and G play no role in these empirical contents. We illustrate
this for A; the arguments for G are analogous. If we consider all of the brands in a
product category, then from (1) and
∑
j sj = 1, we obtain A = 1/
∑
j(a+rj)
−b. If the
brands below some level of market share are excluded from consideration (for practical
reasons, data sets on market shares typically exclude brands with very small market
shares), then from (1) and
∑
j sj < 1, we obtain A < 1/
∑
j(a+ rj)
−b. In either case,
the scaling coefficient A does not affect the empirical content of the power law noted
earlier. Further, each market share is less than unity because, as discussed earlier,
the market share for each brand is positive, and because
∑
j sj = 1 or
∑
j sj < 1,
depending on whether we consider all brands in the product category or whether the
brands below some level of market share are excluded.3
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
We examine two sets of data. The first, made available by Nielsen Market Re-
search, reports the market shares of 506 brands in 48 product categories of foods.
These market shares are for a large urban market in the Southwestern US, aggre-
gated over the 120 weeks from January 1993 to May 1995. The second data set is
published by the Sporting Goods Association of America. It contains the market
shares in the US for 665 brands in 43 product categories of sporting goods, aggre-
gated over the 1999 calendar year. The first column in Table 1 displays the number
of brands in each product category for foods. The names of the product categories
are not displayed in this table because these were withheld by those providing the
data. Table 2 lists the names of the product categories for sporting goods and the
number of brands in each product category. In these tables, we have displayed the
product categories in descending order of the number of brands within a category.
This mode of presentation of product categories will be helpful later.
As is the case with most data sets for market shares of brands, these two data
sets reflect the motivations and constraints of those who created them. In brief, the
following aspects seem noteworthy: (a) The data on foods, collected at the store
level for a smaller geographical area, is perhaps more accurate than that on sporting
goods. A limitation of the former data is the exclusion of certain types of stores
from the Nielsen audits. (b) The construction of product categories is not based on
explicit considerations of empirical research. For example, we do not have a random
3The notion of a “long tail,” sometimes associated with the power law, can be understood in the
present context as follows. If the number of brands is large then, from fj > fj+1, many brands at
the lower end of ranks will have market shares which are quite comparable to one another. Such a
long tail will not arise if the number of brands is small. The empirical content of the power law is
orthogonal to the presence or absence of a long tail.
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selection of product categories of foods and sporting goods. We have used all of the
data available to us. (c) All market shares are in equivalent (quantity) units, without
distinguishing brand variations and SKUs. For example, Minute Maid orange juice
is sold in different variations, such as with or without pulp or calcium, and in various
sizes. The data on the sales of the Minute Maid brand add the units (that is, gallons)
across variations and sizes. (d) The data exclude brands with market shares smaller
than 1%. Such exclusions of small brands are, for practical reasons, common among
data sets on market shares. (e) As seen in Tables 1 and 2, the number of brands is
small for several product categories. This aspect is also common among data sets
on market shares. It arises in part because of the exclusions just noted and in part
because some product categories are dominated by a few large brands.
For the above reasons, and also because we have examined a total of only 91
product categories, the patterns reported in this paper are tentative, and it is an
open question whether such patterns exist in other data sets. At the same time,
many of these caveats are partly ameliorated by our findings. Our two data sets
represent a relatively broad range of products in their respective markets, namely,
for foods and sporting goods. These two markets are quite unrelated, including
regarding consumers’ reasons for buying or not buying particular goods or brands, and
producers’ methods of selling their products. The two data sets differ in the length of
time over which the data has been collected; one year for foods as against 18 months
for sporting goods. The data sets also differ in their geographical coverage; regional
for foods as opposed to national for sporting goods. Moreover, these two data sets
have been constructed by two different organizations under different procedures and
with different objectives, without any coordination with each other. Notwithstanding
these key differences, our empirical findings from the two sets of data are very similar.
This could be viewed as a partial indication that our results and conclusions are likely
to be robust in spite of the unique characteristics or limitations of the data sets.
Estimation methods. One set of estimates presented in this paper consists of
the parameters of the power law and the exponential form for each of the product
categories of foods and sporting goods. For brevity, we refer to these as “category-
specific” parameters. This shorthand also reduces the possibility of confusion between
these parameters, which are specific to each product category, and those that are
estimated for each of the three derived data sets, which, it may be recalled, contain
data selected across product categories. All of our parameter estimates for the derived
data sets are based on the minimization of the sum of squared-errors (MSSE).
We employ two different estimation methods for category-specific parameters.
The first method is the MSSE. Under this method, category-specific parameters are
estimated using only the data for the product category under consideration. The sec-
ond method is hierarchical Bayes estimation of random-coefficients models (RCM).
Under this method, we estimate category-specific parameters by pooling the data for
all product categories. Each of these two methods has its advantages and disadvan-
tages. Among the advantages of the MSSE is that it is simple and familiar, and its
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estimates are unbiased. At the same time, as will be seen below, these estimates
have certain limitations, especially for the product categories that have a very small
number of brands. An advantage of the RCM is that in some sense it makes better
use of the available data. Another advantage is that it allows for the comparison of
non-nested models, taking into account the fact that the exponential form has one
less parameter than the power law (Kass and Raftery 1995). A caveat in the use of
the RCM is that, as stated earlier, the product categories in our data are not a ran-
dom sample of the respective universes of the product categories of foods or sporting
goods. Also, the RCM estimates are biased, because these are posteriors obtained by
combining common priors with category-specific information. What is noteworthy
from our point of view is that the MSSE and the RCM are mutually complementary,
in that they yield the same qualitative conclusions. We describe the details of the
MSSE below in the main body of the paper, and those of the RCM in the appendix.
As seen in the appendix, the RCM estimates show an overwhelming superiority of
the power law over the exponential form. The values of the Bayes factors, which
are commonly used for comparing such non-nested models, are e263 for the product
categories of foods and e423 for those of sporting goods.
In certain cases, the market shares in a product category are identical up to two
decimal places. In such cases, we assign the same average rank to these tied data
points. Thus, for instance, if the market shares are identical for the two brands below
the highest-ranked brand, then r2 = r3 = 2.5.
We use a nonlinear procedure to estimate the parameters of the power law by
rewriting (1) as ln sj = lnA − b ln(a + rj). For the exponential form, we linearly
estimate the parameters by rewriting (2) as ln sj = lnG− grj.
As we noted earlier, the number of brands is small for several product categories.
For example, as seen in the lower rows of Table 1, there are 6 or fewer brands in each
of 16 out of 48 product categories of foods. This aspect of the data has some conse-
quences for the MSSE estimates of category-specific parameters.4 One consequence is
that, as is to be expected, the parameter estimates based on too few data points will
likely have large standard errors. This typically turns out to be the case, especially
for some of the estimates of the power law. Another consequence is as follows. For
some product categories, the R2 values for the power law estimates increase mono-
tonically with the value of b, and this increase is nearly imperceptible for values of
b larger than 10. For example, an increase in the value of b from 10 to 50 typically
increases the R2 value by less than 0.01, on base values of R2 generally in excess of
0.9. These product categories have two distinguishing features, which can be seen in
Tables 1 and 2, in comparison to those in which this issue concerning the value of b
does not arise. First, these product categories typically, but not in every case, have
fewer brands. Second, the R2 values for the power law for these product categories
are very close to the corresponding R2 values for the exponential form. This latter
4These consequences do not arise for the RCM estimates. Recall that, under this method,
category-specific parameter estimates are obtained by pooling data for all product categories.
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feature suggests an interpretation in view of Mandelbrot’s prediction, cited earlier,
that a power law with sufficiently large values of b approximates an exponential form.
The interpretation is that, within the limitations of the data, the power law and the
exponential form are roughly equally good descriptions for these product categories,
and, thus, besides being large, the value of b does not indicate anything in addition
to the preceding interpretation. Keeping this in mind, for these product categories,
we have used a value of 10 for b in the parameter estimates presented in the paper;
estimates with larger values of b are available upon request from the authors.
Restrictions on the magnitudes of market shares. The restrictions on these mag-
nitudes are that: (i) a market shares should be positive and less than unity; and (ii)
the sum of the market shares should be no larger than unity, given that our data sets
exclude brands with less than 1% market share. In Section II, we showed that these
conditions are satisfied by the theoretical statements of the power law and the expo-
nential form. One empirical approach with regard to these restrictions is to a priori
force them within the estimation procedures, so that the estimates of the parameters
will, by design, satisfy these restrictions. Another approach, which we follow here,
is to obtain estimates of the parameters without forcing any of these restrictions,
and then to assess whether the estimates are consistent with one or another of such
restrictions.5 We present below our findings in this regard for the power law; those
for the exponential form are analogous.
For all of our estimates, we find that the predicted market share of each brand
is positive and less than unity. We also find that, for each of an overwhelming
proportion of our product categories (84 out of 91), the sum of the predicted market
shares of brands is less than unity. A reason for the seven exceptions is as follows. The
estimated market shares, and therefore their sum, are random variables because the
estimates of the parameters are random variables. The sum of the predicted market
shares is therefore more likely to exceed unity for a product category for which the
sum of the actual market shares is closer to unity. Among the exceptions, the smallest
sum of the actual market shares is 0.968 and the largest is 0.997.
5This approach has the advantage that it potentially illustrates additional strengths of the the-
oretical specifications and empirical procedures. Analogous issues have been debated for decades in
the literature in economics on the estimation of systems of equations describing consumers’ expendi-
tures on various categories of goods and services; see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Chapter 3) for
a review of this literature which began in the 1930s. The neoclassical economic theory of consumer
demand suggests several restrictions on the parameters of such equations, in addition to the restric-
tion that the “budget shares” (that is, the shares of the expenditure on various categories) should
add up to one. The early research in this area generally tended to incorporate such restrictions
into the estimation procedures, so that the estimates will tautologically satisfy these restrictions.
The subsequent literature (for example, Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1975) has generally been
in favor of obtaining the parameter estimates without bringing such restrictions into the picture,
and then analyzing the extent to which the estimations satisfy such restrictions.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 displays the estimated parameters, and the corresponding values of R2, for
the power law and the exponential form, separately for each of the 48 food categories.
Table 2 displays the corresponding results for the 43 sporting-goods categories. These
results suggest that the power law holds well in an absolute sense. For example, for
foods, the value of R2 for the power law is greater than or equal to 0.95 for 37 out of a
total of 48 product categories, and it is larger than 0.9 for 44 product categories. For
sporting goods, the value of R2 for the power law is greater than or equal to 0.95 for
41 out of a total of 43 product categories, and it is larger than 0.9 for all 43 product
categories. A value of one is displayed for the R2 in some cases in this paper because
we have rounded off these values to two places after the decimal.
Parameter estimates (of a, g and unrestricted b) that are statistically significant
at the 5% confidence level are shown in boldface in Tables 1 and 2. Error estimates
are not applicable if the reported value of b is 10, given the restriction mentioned
earlier. The overall picture in this regard is that, if a parameter estimate is not
significant, then it is typically but not always the case that the corresponding product
category has a small number of brands. This can be seen in two different ways in
Tables 1 and 2, in which, as was noted earlier, the product categories are displayed
in descending order of the number of brands within a category. First, compared to
food categories, many more of the estimates of b are significant among sporting goods
categories, which typically also have more brands within individual categories than
food categories. Second, the estimates of b that are significant are concentrated more
among the upper rows of each of these two tables than among the lower rows.
Figure 1 shows how the values of R2 for the power law and the exponential form
differ at different values of b.6 The upper panel in Figure 1 is for food categories.
The values of b for food product categories are taken from Table 1, and the product
categories are reordered according to ascending values of b. The numbers displayed
on the horizontal axis of this panel are the labels of the product categories, after this
reordering. These numbers are in themselves not relevant to what this figure shows.
The vertical axis displays the corresponding values of R2 for the power law as well
as for the exponential form. The lower panel of Figure 1 presents the corresponding
results for sporting goods. These two panels show that, for lower values of b, the
values of R2 for the power law are substantially larger than those for the exponential
form, and that the values of R2 from the two models are less distinguishable at higher
values of b. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of Mandelbrot
(1963) that a power law with large values of b approximates the exponential form.
6The R2 value here refers to the proportion of explained variance in the logarithm of the values
of market shares for each product category. As we use a non-linear estimation procedure for the
power-law model, the proportion of explained variance does not have the usual statistical properties
associated with R2 in a linear regression model. However, it is still a reasonable measure for the
limited purpose of comparing the fits of the two models.
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We now set up the apparatus to describe, graphically and mathematically, the
derived data sets that we create by separating and combining, in particular ways, the
raw data across product categories. All of the derived data sets are industry specific;
that is, the data for foods are not combined with the data for sporting goods. Figure
2 is a graphical aid to understanding the derived data sets; the upper panel is for
foods and the lower panel is for sporting goods. This figure displays the market
shares for each rank across product categories. That is, the highest-ranked market
shares for various product categories form the vertical cluster at rank = 1, the second-
highest-ranked shares form the vertical cluster at rank = 2, and so on. Note that
the neighboring clusters in Figure 2 overlap in their vertical ranges. However, their
means are quite well separated, as will be seen later in Figure 5.
We now introduce some notation to deal with multiple product categories and
to formally define the derived data sets. The index i = 1 to m represents product
categories. Thus, m is 48 for foods. Within product category i, there are ni brands.
We assign the index j = 1 to ni to the brands in non-increasing order of market
shares, breaking ties arbitrarily. After the ties are broken using the protocol described
earlier, we assign the rank rij to brand j in category i. The market share of brand
j in product category i is sij. Let H ≡ maxi ni denote the largest number of brands
in any of the m product categories. Thus, as Table 1 shows, H = 27 is the largest
number of brands in any food category. For each 1 ≤ h ≤ H, we define a set ψ(h)
whose elements are the indices of product categories with h or more brands; that is,
ψ(h) = {i|h ≤ ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ m}. Then the data in Figure 2 is described as follows. The
vertical cluster at rank = 1 displays the numbers {si1|i ∈ ψ(1)}, the vertical cluster
at rank = 2 displays the numbers {si2|i ∈ ψ(2)}, and so on.
The first derived data set, presented in Figure 3, pools the market shares of brands
across all product categories. Put differently, this figure displays the observations
contained in all of the vertical clusters in Figure 2, combined together, and then
rearranged in descending order. Formally, Figure 3 displays {sij|1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤
i ≤ m}, rearranged in descending order. The upper two panels are for foods and the
lower two panels are for sporting goods. The left panels are for the power law and
the right panels are for the exponential form. In addition to the data, each panel
presents the parameter estimates (namely, a and b for the power law, and g for the
exponential form), the value of R2, and a line that describes the pattern predicted by
the estimated parameters. We follow the same conventions for graphical presentations
in later figures.
The second derived data set, presented in Figure 4, contains the market shares of
brands that hold the highest rank in their respective product categories. Thus, this
figure displays the numbers that form the vertical cluster at rank = 1 in Figure 2,
ordered by their rank within this cluster. Formally, these numbers are {si1|i ∈ ψ(1)},
rearranged in descending order.
The third derived data set, presented in Figure 5, displays the averages of the
market shares of brands that hold a particular rank in their respective product cat-
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egories. For example, the market share displayed at rank = 1 in Figure 5 is the
average of the vertical cluster at rank = 1 in Figure 2. Formally, Figure 5 displays
{∑i∈ψ(h) sih/|ψ(h)|, 1 ≤ h ≤ H}, rearranged in descending order, where |ψ(h)| is the
number of elements in ψ(h).
As can be seen from Figures 3, 4 and 5, the power law holds very well in an
absolute sense. All of the estimates (of a, g and unrestricted b) presented in these
figures are significant at the 5% level. In Figures 3 and 5, the values of R2 for the
power law are larger than those for the exponential form. In Figure 4, the value of
R2 for the power law is comparable to that for the exponential form. Mandelbrot’s
prediction, discussed earlier, applies in this case.
Finally, recall our conclusion that the exponential form fits better for lower-
ranking market shares than for higher-ranking market shares. Consider Figure 3
as an illustration; analogous observations hold for all of our other results. The lines
in the right-hand panels of this figure describe the pattern predicted by the estimated
parameters of the exponential form. The fits provided by these lines are markedly
better for lower-ranking market shares than for higher-ranking market shares. There
is no such visual asymmetry in the fits provided by the power law, which are presented
in the left-hand panels of Figure 3.
V. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe and motivate a theoretical framework that relates
to our empirical findings and to several other observations presented earlier. This
framework is based on a model of Hill (1970, 1974) and its subsequent developments
(Hill and Woodroofe 1975, Chen 1978); see Aoki (1996, pp. 226–236) for a partial but
succinct summary. Among the strengths of this framework are that it leads to some
intuitive interpretations; it connects with more than one part of marketing literature
which have been developed independently of issues of interest here; it accommodates
multiple product categories; and it allows for the entry and exit of brands. We begin
this section with a brief description of the DM distribution and some of its special
cases. This will facilitate the rest of this section because this distribution is the
foundation of our theoretical framework. We then note those aspects of Hill’s model
that are pertinent for the present paper. This is followed by a discussion of some
predictions of Hill’s model in relation to our empirical findings. We then describe some
of the ways in which our theoretical framework is connected to marketing literature.
This is followed by a brief discussion of an alternative theoretical model of the power
law. At the end of this section, we present some caveats pertaining to our theoretical
framework.
The DM distribution. For expositional simplicity, we begin with only one product
category that has n brands. Define p ≡ (p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn), where pj denotes the
probability that a consumer buys one unit of brand j. Define ` ≡ (`1, `2, `3, . . . , `n),
where `j is the number of units of brand j purchased by the consumer, and define
N ≡ ∑ `j. For brevity, in the preceding expression and in the rest of this section,
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we suppress the range of the index j over sums and products; j ranges from 1 to
n. The purchase of brands is a zero-order process. Given p, the probability that the
consumer buys `j units of brand j is given by the multinomial distribution:
Pr(`|p) = N !
∏
p
`j
j /`j!. (3)
The heterogeneity in consumer preferences is represented by the specification that p
has a Dirichlet distribution with parameters (α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn). That is,
Pr(p) =
Γ(
∑
αj)∏
Γ(αj)
∏
p
αj−1
j . (4)
Expressions (3) and (4) yield the following unconditional probability that consumers
buy `j units of each brand j:
Pr(`) = N !
Γ(
∑
αi)
Γ(N +
∑
αi)
·
∏
Γ(`j + αj)∏{Γ(αj)Γ(`j + 1)} , (5)
which is the DM distribution. Consider the parameterization where αj = α, for all
j = 1, . . . , n. If α = 1, then the DM distribution just described reduces to Bose–
Einstein statistics (Fader and Schmittlein 1993, p. 481)
Pr(`) = 1
/(N − 1
n− 1
)
. (6)
Hill’s model. A derivation of Hill’s model and its subsequent developments will
be redundant and far too detailed for our purpose. Here we note some of its critical
elements, assumptions, and predictions. For vividness, this abstract model uses the
language of species, genera, and families. In its lieu, given our context, we use the
language of market shares, brands, product categories, and so on. Hill’s formal deriva-
tions are based on (6), and he conjectures (Hill 1974, p. 1024) that his results hold
for all symmetrical non-degenerate DM distributions; that is, for expression (5) with
all values of α except α = ∞, in which case (5) reduces to the Maxwell–Boltzmann
distribution.7 Chen (1978) proves many parts of this conjecture, including for the
first result discussed in the next subsection, and, to our knowledge, the remaining
parts have not so far been refuted. It is further possible that the predictions described
in the next subsection do not necessarily require the assumption that the DM distri-
bution be symmetric. That is, these predictions may hold without any restrictions
on the values of (α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn), except that each of these parameters is finite in
value.
Hill’s model incorporates multiple product categories and allows the number of
brands in each category to be a random variable, thereby accommodating the intro-
duction and withdrawal of brands from the market for various product categories. Let
7See Feller (1968, pp. 38–43) for a discussion of Bose–Einstein statistics and the Maxwell–
Boltzmann distribution.
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m denote the number of product categories, where m is large. The product category
i has ni brands with total sales Ni. Leaving aside some technical conditions, Hill’s
model assumes that: (i) purchases are independent across product categories; (ii) the
number ni of brands within a category is random; and (iii) ni/Ni is independent across
product categories. This model uses asymptotic arguments. Our heuristic numeri-
cal simulations suggest that the patterns predicted by the model become increasingly
recognizable as the value of one or more ni is increased, and that the patterns become
reasonably recognizable if ni > 10 for all i.
Predictions. One prediction concerning the derived data sets is that the power law
arises, in an approximate sense, when the market shares are pooled across product
categories. As shown in Figure 3, our findings support this prediction. Another
prediction is that the power law arises among the highest-ranked market shares across
product categories. As shown in Figure 4, and as discussed earlier, the power law fits
this derived data set well. Finally, we have presented a pattern in Figure 5 which is
not predicted by Hill’s model. Recall that, in this figure, we: (i) calculated the mean
of the k-th largest market shares across product categories, and (ii) arranged these
means in descending order. Our analysis suggests that the power law is a reasonable
description of this derived data set.
Relationships between the theoretical framework and marketing literature. The
following are among the relationships: (i) Expression (5) for the DM distribution
has been widely studied and validated in marketing literature for analyzing brand
purchases of consumers (Goodhardt, Ehrenberg and Chatfield 1984). (ii) Recall the
parameters (α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn) representing the heterogeneity in consumer prefer-
ences. For a simple interpretation of this heterogeneity, consider the special case in
which these parameters take the same value, namely αj = α, and n = 2. Then (4)
becomes a Beta density with parameters (α, α). If α = 1, this Beta density implies a
uniform distribution of preferences for brands within the product category. The het-
erogeneity distribution is U-shaped if α < 1, representing a symmetric polarization
of preferences for brands. If α > 1, the heterogeneity distribution is unimodal, and
its variance around the mode decreases as the value of α increases. (iii) If consumers
buy sufficiently large quantities of each brand, then an intuitive implication of the
DM distribution (5) is that the expected probability that the next unit purchased will
be of a particular brand is proportional to the number of units of this brand already
purchased. This implication follows an expression derived by Fader and Schmittlein
(1993, p. 481). (iv) The preceding implication is also obtained from Bose–Einstein
statistics without the need to make any assumption concerning the magnitudes of
previous purchases by consumers. This conclusion follows from the expression just
cited.
An alternative model of the power law. The power law has been derived from
Gibrat’s Law (Ijiri and Simon 1975), which is well known. In our context, this
law posits that period-to-period changes in the sales of a brand follow a process in
which the probability of any specified percentage change is independent of the brand’s
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present size. In other words, the sales of each brand have the same probability
of increasing or decreasing by 5 percent, 10 percent, or any other fixed amount,
regardless of current sales. Note that this implication is the same in its content as
those noted in parts (iii) and (iv) of the previous subsection. This is not a coincidence.
Ijiri and Simon (1975) have shown that Bose–Einstein statistics can be derived from
Gibrat’s Law.
We have used the DM distribution as the starting point of our theoretical frame-
work and not Gibrat’s Law, even though the preceding discussion suggests that the
two share some similarities in their implications. One reason for this choice of ours
is that, as seen earlier, there are many direct ways in which the DM distribution
is connected to marketing literature. Another reason is as follows. Our theoretical
framework provides a natural, although simplified, structure to deal with many prod-
uct categories and to incorporate the entry and exit of brands. We are not aware of
any theoretical framework which begins with Gibrat’s Law and is able to accomplish
the same.
Caveats. We recognize that, like the DM paradigm of brand purchases, our theo-
retical framework is based on a “reduced-form” stochastic model, and is not directly
derived from such “micro” considerations as the perceptions, motivations, and en-
vironments of consumers and firms. The same caveats also apply to Gibrat’s Law.
A topic for future research is the integration of our framework with choice-theoretic
models of consumers and firms. Some comments on this topic are presented in the
concluding section.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS
Managerial implications. One view in marketing is that managers place too much
emphasis on market share rather than on other fundamentals of brand performance
(Jacobson and Aaker 1985). Our results suggest that the attention managers devote
to market share may be justified for high-share brands, where there are large, discrete
gaps in the attainable values of market share. This contrasts with the common view,
shared both by practitioners and academic researchers, that market shares change in
incremental steps in response to small changes in advertising, promotions, pricing, or
other activities. If the latter were true, one would expect to find no consistent pattern
of the kind we obtain, except that, by definition, a higher-ranked brand will have a
larger market share than a lower-ranked brand. One could say nothing about the
relationship between the market shares of successively-ranked brands. In contrast,
we find a recurrent pattern across product categories thatjumps in market shares are
predicted by a power law to a remarkable degree of accuracy. This suggests that
each market has a set of “stable” levels of market shares that can be occupied. If
this is true, then incremental changes in efforts can produce only short-term changes
in market shares. Over time, these will average out and a stable pattern of market
shares will emerge. In stable markets, such as those we have examined, these patterns
will persist until one firm or another invests large resources to procure the large gains
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in share that can take it to a higher stable share level. Accordingly, managers seeking
sustained gains in market share in stable markets may not be successful by increasing
efforts and resources devoted to a brand in small increments.
A related implication concerns the setting of yearly market-share goals, a common
task for brand managers. Our results suggest that the smallest target for an increase
is to the market share that the power law associates with the next highest rank.
Higher possible targets are those associated with higher ranks. These target levels
can be useful for planning how much resources to commit to a brand. Note that
this approach implies that a manager should primarily consider discrete changes in
targets for market share.
A third use of the present results is for assessing the performance of brands,
and for relating this assessment to marketing actions. Comparing a brand’s current
market share against the level predicted for its rank by the power law for the product
category can indicate whether it is performing below or above par. If a brand has
a higher market share than that predicted by its rank, it might be ready to move
up a rank. If it has a lower market share than that predicted by its rank, it might
need to be better defended against competitors. This analysis can extend to cross-
category comparisons of brands. Thus, a brand with 15% market share in one product
category might be a better performer than another brand with a 25% market share
in another product category if the first is performing above par for its rank, and the
second is not. Managers can use such information when allocating resources across
brands in different product categories. Financial analysts can use it to evaluate the
performance of brands in different product categories.
A fourth use of the present results is for assessing potential instabilities in markets.
For example, if two brands in a product category have the same market shares,
then the market is unstable — one or another brand will gain or lose market share
until a power-law pattern reappears. This information can be useful for identifying
opportunities and potential threats in an unstable market.
Implications for research. The marketing literature on pioneering advantage sug-
gests that earlier entrants sustain larger market shares than later entrants. Kalya-
naram, Robinson and Urban (1995) find a power law relation between order of entry
and market shares. They estimate the special case of (1) with a = 0 and b = 1/2,
where r is the order of market entry, for prescription anti-ulcer drugs and certain
packaged consumer goods. We find that the power law pattern holds for a vastly
larger number of product categories without any reference to the order-of-entry. This
suggests the need to separate the effects of pioneering advantage from the rank-share
relations we report in this paper.
A second implication of our results is that it may be useful to construct models
in which marketing efforts and activities are related to the discrete levels of market
shares predicted by a power law. The power-law parameters themselves would then
be related to such category-level variables as the total advertising expenditures and
average prices across brands in the category.
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VII. BRIEF REMARKS ON FUTURE RESEARCH
To keep this paper within reasonable bounds of length and scope, and also because
of the limitations of our data sets, we have abstracted from several important research
issues that are closely related to or that follow naturally from this paper. For example,
our data on foods and sporting goods contain market shares aggregated respectively
over 120 weeks for a regional market and over one year for a national market, and
they do not contain details of individual purchase histories or sales over shorter time
spans. In Section III, we described other aspects of our data and also the reasons
why our results are likely to hold for comparable aggregations over time spans and
geographies. Leaving aside the considerations of these or other data sets, we now
present brief remarks on some research issues which are substantive in themselves
and which are not limited to testing the boundaries of our findings within proximities
of the analysis presented in this paper.
One research issue is whether patterns of the kind that we have identified hold
for other aggregations, including those over time (for example, weekly and monthly),
geographies (such as states, counties and townships; or rural and urban areas), types
of purchase outlets, and consumer segments (such as heavy or light users of a prod-
uct category, or different benefit segments). Another research issue, distinct from the
previous one, is the effect of various aggregations on the values of the estimated pa-
rameters. This is because, even if a pattern is known to hold for two or more different
data aggregations, the values of the parameters (such as b or g) of this pattern may
be similar or dissimilar across these aggregations, depending on the types of aggrega-
tions under consideration. Yet another issue, related to the previous two, is whether
a pattern under consideration holds over time, and if it does, what is the nature of
intertemporal changes in the values of the parameters describing the pattern. Anal-
yses of such research issues are likely to depend in part on the characteristics of the
markets and consumer segments which are pertinent to the data under consideration.
Among these characteristics are: mature versus new markets (there is some evidence
that mature markets exhibit fewer intertemporal changes in the market shares); sta-
ble markets versus those in transition; markets for durable versus nondurable goods;
seasonality (a large fraction of the annual volume of some products, such as house-
hold batteries, is sold within a few weeks of the year); dominance of different types
of stores (for some categories, Wal-Mart alone accounts for a large fraction of the
total volume); the relative roles of national versus regional or local brands; and the
extent to which consumers seek variety. Analyses of the issues of the kind noted in
this paragraph will take this paper far afield. For this reason, we view them as topics
for future research.
At the beginning of this paper, we noted that our analysis is descriptive rather
than causal. The following brief remarks relate this observation to marketing practice
and research. At a phenomenological level, firms are concerned, often on an ongo-
ing basis, with variables such as targeting and product positioning, product quality
and brand equity, pricing and promotions, advertising expenditures and distribution
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intensity. A substantial body of research has used such variables to understand the
market shares of brands; for example, Guadagni and Little (1983), Lancaster (1990)
and McFadden (1986). For brevity of exposition, we will refer to these approaches
as “causational.” This research also includes, with various degrees of explicitness,
considerations such as the histories of firms, the strategic interplay among firms, the
behavior of consumers and intermediaries, the dynamics of product growth and in-
novation, and different kinds of uncertainties and expectations. Much of value has
been learned from this literature, and will continue to be learned from its future
developments. We believe that our analysis complements the above literature. A
macroscopic study such as ours deals with the question of where brands end up in
terms of market shares, and not of how they get there. A focus of causational studies
is to understand the relationship between the firms’ market shares and their efforts
and environments. We anticipate these two approaches to converge at some stage in
the future.
We conclude with a speculative remark on the role of chance. On the face of it,
there is not much in common between the market for soft drinks and the market for
handguns in the United States, including the sizes and characteristics of the firms
in each of the two markets. We nevertheless find that the power law describes the
patterns of market shares in these markets as well as in a number of other disparate
product markets considered in this paper. The power law also holds in a number of
different ways across product markets, as was shown by our analysis of the derived
data sets. This suggests that chance plays a deep role. Kendall (1961, p. 12) has the
following to say on the role of chance: “In fact, not only can choice mimic chance,
but chance can mimic choice. Consider, for example, a number of persons with equal
stakes playing at a fair zero-sum game (A zero-sum game is one in which the losses
of some players pass to others, so that no money is lost to the system).8 Over a
period of play, the distribution of their holdings will tend to an unequal pattern of
the Pareto type; some people will be reduced to small or zero stakes and a few will
accumulate large reserves. And if the game goes on long enough, ultimately all the
money will be concentrated in a few hands. Thus chance, which might be expected
to level things out, will act in a very inegalitarian way and produce a distribution
with a very purposive-looking outcome. It is not Providence but Chance which is on
the side of the big battalions.”
8Evolutions of market shares are, by definition, zero-sum changes; firms’ gains and losses must
add up to zero. (This footnote is not part of the quotation.)
16
APPENDIX
Hierarchical Bayes Estimates of Random-Coefficients Models
In the main body of the paper, we estimated the category-specific parameters for
each product category using the data for that category only. These estimates were
based on the minimization of the sum of squared errors (MSSE). In this appendix,
we present estimates which complement those reported in the paper. We estimate
random-coefficients models in which the data are pooled across product categories.
Under these models, the parameters for each category are assumed to be draws from a
suitable population distribution of the parameters. A caveat regarding the estimates
presented here is that the product categories in our data are not a random sample of
the respective universes of product categories of foods or sporting goods.
For convenience, we recall our basic notation. We use the index i = 1 to m to
represent product categories. Within the product category i, there are ni brands.
We assign the index j = 1 to ni to the brands in category i in non-increasing order
of market shares. We use the protocol described in the paper to assign a rank rij to
brand j in category i. The market share of brand j in product category i is sij. The
expressions for the power law and the exponential form are then respectively
sij = Ai(ai + rij)
−bi ; and (A1)
sij = Gie
−girij . (A2)
Our objective is to estimate the parameters (ai, bi, gi); for reasons described in the
text, we do not estimate the parameters (Ai, Gi). For later use, we define zij ≡ si1/sij.
Then, from (A1) and (A2)
zij =
(
ai + rij
ai + ri1
)bi
(A3)
for the power law, and
zij = e
−gi(ri1−rij) (A4)
for the exponential form. In each of our product categories, only one brand has
the highest market share. Hence ri1 = 1, zi1 = 1 and rij ≥ 2 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ ni
and all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since all zi1 equal unity, we do not use them in our estimates.
Define xij ≡ rij − 1, and yij ≡ ln zij. We take logarithms of both sides of (A3) and
(A4) to obtain the following expressions for the power law and the exponential form
respectively:
yij = bi ln
(
1 +
xij
ai + 1
)
, and (A5)
yij = gixij. (A6)
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We use these expressions to estimate the parameters (ai, bi, gi). We now describe the
key aspects of our method of estimation, first for the power law and then for the
exponential form.
Power law. We assume that the values of ai and bi for each product category are ran-
dom draws from a suitable population distribution. In many situations, it is natural
to assume a normal distribution for such parameters. However, for reasons noted in
the paper, we require that ai+1 > 0 and bi > 0. Therefore, a reasonable assumption,
which we adopt here, is that ai + 1 and bi have a bivariate lognormal distribution.
That is, βi1 ≡ ln(ai + 1) and βi2 ≡ ln(bi) have a bivariate normal distribution. Let
βi ≡ (βi1, βi2) be drawn from a population with distribution N(µ,Λ), where µ is a
2 × 1 vector of population means and Λ is a 2 × 2 covariance matrix. We estimate
βi in the model
yij = exp(βi2) ln
[
1 +
xij
exp(βi1)
]
+ eij for 2 ≤ j ≤ ni and 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (A7)
where eij ∼ N(0, σ2). We define the vectors yi ≡ (yi1, yi2, yi3 . . . , yini) and
y ≡ (y1,y2,y3, . . . ,ym). The likelihood function for product category i is
Li(βi) =
ni∏
j=2
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
(yij − wij)2
σ2
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (A8)
where wij ≡ exp(βi2) ln(1 + (xij/ exp(βi1))). Let φ(βi) denote the density for the
bivariate normal distribution N(µ,Λ). We assume that the data for each product
category is independent of the data for the other product categories. The uncon-
ditional likelihood for a random sample of m categories is given by the continuous
mixture
L =
m∏
i=1
∫ ∫
Li (βi)φ(βi)dβi. (A9)
The unconditional likelihood cannot be written in closed form because the normal
population distribution is not conjugate to the conditional likelihood Li.We therefore
use hierarchical Bayes methods to estimate the parameters. We use proper but diffuse
priors. The joint prior is a product of independent priors over µ, Λ and σ2. We
assume that the prior for µ is a normal distribution N(δ,C). The covariance matrix
C may be specified to be diagonal with the elements (variances) set to a large value
(we set this value to 100) to represent vague knowledge. Under this assumption for
C, the value of δ is no longer critical and so we set δ = 0. We assume that the
prior for the precision matrix Λ−1 has a Wishart distribution9 W (ρ, (ρR)−1) with
9The Wishart density with ν degrees of freedom is
p(V |ν,Ω) = c |V |
(ν−k−1)/2
|Ω|ν/2 exp
(− tr(Ω−1V )/2),
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ρ ≥ 2 degrees of freedom, where R is a 2 × 2 symmetric positive definite matrix.
The parameterization Λ−1 ∼ W (ρ, (ρR)−1) implies that E(Λ−1) = R−1. Hence, R is
approximately the expected prior covariance matrix of the individual-specific βi’s. As
Var(Λij) is decreasing in ρ, small values of ρ correspond to vaguer prior distributions.
We set R to be an identity matrix and ρ = 3. Finally, we assume that the prior for
σ2 is Inverse Gamma IG(a, b), with a = 3 and b = 1.
We use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to simulate dependent
draws from the joint posterior distribution. This approach replaces one complicated
draw from the posterior distribution with a series of relatively simple draws from dis-
tributions that are easy to sample. Samples from the posterior are obtained by iter-
atively sampling from the full conditional distributions of different parameter blocks.
The MCMC sampler is run for a large number of iterations. This iterative scheme
generates a Markov chain that converges in distribution to the joint posterior dis-
tribution under fairly general conditions (Tierney 1994). After an initial transient
phase, also known as the burn-in period, the chain converges to the posterior distri-
bution of parameters; all subsequent draws may be regarded as sample draws from
the posterior distribution. After this convergence takes place, the sample of draws
can be used to approximate the posterior to any desired degree of accuracy.
If all full conditionals have closed forms, the MCMC sampler reduces to the Gibbs
sampling procedure (Gelfand and Smith 1990; Geman and Geman 1984). In many
situations though, the full conditional distributions for certain parameters are known
only up to a normalizing constant. For these parameters, the Metropolis–Hastings
step (Metropolis et al. 1953, Hastings 1970, Chib and Greenberg 1995) can be used.
In the present context, we need to generate random draws for the unknowns
{{βi},µ,Λ, σ2}. Each iteration of the MCMC sampler involves sampling from the
full conditionals associated with each block of parameters. The sampler produces
draws for the category-specific parameters {βi}, and therefore allows for a proper
accounting of the uncertainty regarding these parameters. The (S + 1)-st iteration
of the MCMC method involves generating random draws using the following full
conditional distributions:
(a) The full conditional for the category-specific parameters βi cannot be written
in closed form because the population distribution N(µ,Λ) is not conjugate to
the category-level power-law likelihood. We therefore use a Metropolis–Hastings
where V and Ω are square, symmetric and positive definite matrices, each with k ≤ ν rows and
columns. The symbol tr denotes the trace of a matrix. The proportionality constant c has the value
c =
1
2(νk)/2pik(k−1)/4
∏k
j=1 Γ
(
ν+1−j
2
) ,
where Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function. Let Ωij denote the ij-th element ofΩ, and let Vij denote the
ij-th element of V . The elements of Ω are scale parameters. The means, variances and covariances
of the elements of V are given by E(Vij) = νΩij , Var(Vij) = ν(Ω2ij + ΩiiΩjj), and Cov(Vij , Vkl) =
ν(ΩikΩjl +ΩilΩjk), respectively.
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step to generate draws from this full conditional. For category i, the posterior
density is proportional to the likelihood
ni∏
j=2
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
(yij − wij)2
σ2
)
(A11)
and the prior N(µ,Λ). We use a random walk Metropolis step to generate
draws for βi. This requires generating a candidate β
C
i from a multivariate
normal proposal density N(βSi ,Ωi). The proposal density is centered on the
old value of βSi , from iteration S. The variance of the proposal density, Ωi, also
known as the tuning constant, is set to allow rapid mixing of the chain. The
generated candidate βCi is accepted with the acceptance probability
α(βSi ,β
C
i ) = min
{
1,
L(βCi )φ(β
C
i |µ,Λ)
L(βSi )φ(β
S
i |µ,Λ)
}
, (A12)
where φ(·) represent the normal density. If the candidate is accepted, βS+1i =
βCi ; otherwise, β
S+1
i = β
S
i . The parameters for the different product categories
can be drawn in sequence. As the acceptance probability depends only on the
ratio of the posterior densities, any normalizing constant cancels out. Hence
the Metropolis step can be used in instances where the full conditional is not
completely known.
(b) The full conditional for µ is a normal distribution. The prior N(δ,C) is con-
jugate to the population distribution, βi ∼ N(µ,Λ). The posterior full condi-
tional distribution can be written as
p(µ|{βi},Λ) = N(µ˜,V µ), (A13)
with posterior precision V −1µ = C
−1+mΛ−1 and posterior mean µ˜ = V µ(C−1δ+∑m
i=1Λ
−1βi).
(c) As the prior W (ρ, (ρR)−1) is conjugate to the normal population distribution
of the category-specific coefficients, the full conditional distribution for the pop-
ulation precision matrix Λ−1 is Wishart. The full conditional can be written
as
p(Λ−1|{βi},µ) =W
(
ρ+m,
[ m∑
i=1
(βi − µ) (βi − µ)
′
+ ρR
]−1)
. (A14)
(d) The full conditional for the error variance is an Inverse Gamma distribution
given by
p(σ2|y,βi) = IG
a+ N
2
,
(
m∑
i=1
ni∑
j=2
(yij − wij)2
2
+ b−1
)−1 , (A15)
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where N is the number of observations.
Exponential form. We omit some details of our estimation methods for the expo-
nential form because these details are identical to those, described above, for the
power law. We assume that the values of gi for each category are random draws
from a suitable probability distribution. For reasons stated in the paper, we require
gi > 0 in (A6). Accordingly, we assume that gi has a lognormal distribution. That
is, βi ≡ ln gi has a normal distribution with population mean µ and variance τ 2. We
estimate βi in the model
yij = exp(βi) · xij + eij, for 2 ≤ j ≤ ni and 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (A16)
where eij ∼ N(0, σ2). The likelihood function for product category i is
Li(βi) =
ni∏
j=2
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
−1
2
(yij − wij)2
σ2
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (A17)
where wij ≡ exp(βi) · xij. Let φ(βi) denote the density for the normal distribution
N(µ, τ 2). The unconditional likelihood for a random sample of m categories is given
by the continuous mixture
L =
m∏
i=1
∫
Li (βi)φ(βi)dβi. (A18)
The normal population distribution is not conjugate to the conditional likelihood Li.
Therefore the unconditional likelihood cannot be written in closed form. As with the
power law, we use hierarchical Bayes methods to estimate the parameters. We use
(proper) independent and diffuse priors over µ, τ 2 and σ2. We assume that the prior
for µ is a normal distribution N(δ, c). We set δ = 0 and c = 100 to represent vague
knowledge. We assume that the prior distribution of τ 2 is Inverse Gamma IG(a1, b1),
and that the prior distribution of σ2 is Inverse Gamma IG(a2, b2). We set a1 = a2 = 3
and b1 = b2 = 1.
As in the case of the power law, we use MCMC methods to simulate dependent
draws from the joint posterior distribution. The (S + 1)-st iteration of the MCMC
method involves generating random draws using the following full conditional distri-
butions:
(a) The full conditional for τ 2 is an Inverse Gamma distribution given by
p(τ 2|{βi}, µ) = IG
a1 + m
2
,
(
m∑
i=1
(βi − µ)2
2
+
1
b1
)−1 , (A19)
where m is the number of product categories.
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(b) The full conditional for σ2 is an Inverse Gamma distribution given by
p(σ2) = IG
a2 + N
2
,
(
m∑
i=1
ni∑
j=2
(yij − wij)2
2
+
1
b2
)−1 . (A20)
(c) The full conditional for µ is a normal distribution. As the prior N(δ, c) is conju-
gate to the population distribution βi ∼ N(µ, τ 2), the posterior full conditional
distribution can be written as
p(µ|{βi}, τ) = N(µ˜, vµ), (A21)
with posterior precision v−1µ = c
−1 +mτ−2 and posterior mean µ˜ = vµ(c−1δ +
mβ¯τ−2), where β¯ ≡∑mi=1 βi/m.
(d) The full conditional for βi is a normal distribution given by
p(βi|µ, τ 2, {yi}, σ2) = N(βˆi, vβi) (A22)
where v−1βi = τ
−2 +
∑ni
j=2 x
2
ijσ
−2 and βˆi = vβi[τ
−2µ+
∑ni
j=2 xijσ
−2yij].
Results and comparisons of models. For the power law, a = exp(β1) − 1 and
b = exp(β2), where β1 and β2 are normally distributed random variables. Following
Press (1972, p. 139, Theorem 6.4.1)
E[exp(βj)] = exp[E(βj) +
1
2
var(βj)], j = 1, 2, (A23)
where var(βj) is the variance of βj. For the exponential form, g = exp(β), where β has
a normal distribution. Hence E[g] = E[exp(βj)] is given by an expression analogous
to (A23). For the food categories, the estimated means and variances of β1, β2 and β
are
E[β1] = 1.72, E[β2] = 1.43, E[β] = −0.92, σˆ21 = 2.53, σˆ22 = 1.39, and σˆ2 = 0.36.
From these we obtain
E[a] = 19.79, E[b] = 8.37, and E[g] = 0.48.
Correspondingly, for the sporting-goods categories,
E[β1] = 0.84, E[β2] = 0.62, E[β3] = −1.22, σˆ21 = 1.92, σˆ22 = 0.79, and σˆ2 = 0.38.
From these we obtain
E[a] = 6.05, E[b] = 2.76, and E[g] = 0.36.
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As in the MSSE estimates presented in the main body of the paper, there are more
food categories with larger estimates of a and b, and this is reflected in the above sets
of mean values.
Let Mp denote the model for the power law and let Me denote the model for the
exponential form. We use Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery 1995) to compare the fits
of Mp and Me. Let ηl denote the parameter vector, let pil(ηl|Ml) denote the prior,
and let f(y|Ml,ηl) denote the sampling density for model l ∈ {p, e}. The posterior
odds ratio can be written as
Pr(Mp|y)
Pr(Me|y) =
Pr(Mp)
Pr(Me)
× m(y|Mp)
m(y|Me) , (A24)
where m(y|Ml) =
∫
f(y|Ml,ηl)pil(ηl|Ml)dηl is the marginal likelihood of model l.
The Bayes factor is the ratio of values of the marginal likelihoods. These values
can be computed for each model based on the MCMC draws, using an importance
sampling scheme outlined in Newton and Raftery (1994). The values of the log
marginal likelihoods are as follows:
Data Model Log marginal likelihood
Food categories Power law –35.84
Food categories Exponential form –299.50
Sporting-goods categories Power law –187.14
Sporting-goods categories Exponential form –610.18
The Bayes factor has a value of e263 for the food categories and e423 for the sporting
goods categories. This suggests an overwhelmingly better fit for the power law than
for the exponential form.
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FIGURE 5: Averages of market shares with same rank, across product categories of foods
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